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INTRODUCTION: MAKING THE CASE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL PRISON

Where do individuals sentenced by an international criminal
court go to serve their sentence? The answer is: “it depends.” It
depends on which international tribunal convicted the
individual, which states have entered a cooperation agreement
to enforce sentences with the particular tribunal, and which
state the tribunal believes provides the best fit for that
particular individual.1 Because there is currently no
international prison or single location to enforce the criminal
sentences imposed by international tribunals,2 where a convict
serves their sentence is of constant uncertainty.
There have been many advancements in international
criminal law within the past three decades, including the
development of ad hoc tribunals to try those accused of war
crimes or crimes against humanity.3 The ad hoc tribunals have
1. See Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, Practice Direction on the Procedure for the International Tribunal’s
Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person is to Serve His/Her Sentence of
Imprisonment, ¶¶ 4-5, U.N. Doc. IT/137/Rev. 1 (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Yugoslavia
Practice Direction] (giving the President of the Tribunal power to choose the State of a
convict’s imprisonment after participating countries inform the Tribunal of their
willingness to take on the convict); Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Practice Direction
on the Procedure for Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person Is to Serve
His/Her Sentence of Imprisonment, ¶¶ 2-4 (Sept. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Rwanda Practice
Direction] (giving the President of the Tribunal the power to choose the State of a
convict’s imprisonment after participating countries inform the Tribunal of their
readiness and willingness to take on the convict); Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of
the President, Practice Direction for Designation of State for Enforcement of Sentence,
¶¶ 2-5 (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Practice Direction] (giving the President
of the Tribunal power to choose the State of a convict’s imprisonment after participating
countries inform the Tribunal of their readiness and willingness to take on the convict).
2. See Barbora Holá & Joris van Wijk, Life After Conviction at International
Criminal Tribunals: An Empirical Overview, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 113 (2014)
(explaining that tribunal prisoners are sent to states selected from a list of states willing
to enforce the tribunals’ prison sentences).
3. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (creating an international tribunal that
has the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and adopting the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov.
8, 1994) (adopting the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for violating international humanitarian law
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diminished immunity for some of the world’s most heinous
crimes, excluding terrorism and human trafficking.4 Ratification
of the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”),5 ensures a permanent approach to combating
international crimes: individuals accused of war crimes and
crimes against humanity will either be prosecuted in a court of
law or ostracized and forced to live in hiding.6 This new era of
accountability has resulted in the international prosecutions of
high profile defendants and former heads of state.7 But, there
in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing a United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor to deal with concerns regarding international
humanitarian and human rights law violations); S.C. Res. 1315, ¶¶ 1-2 (Aug. 14, 2000)
(recommending that the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the Sierra
Leone government to create an independent special court to deal with violations of
international humanitarian law).
4. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing the International Criminal
Court with jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
of aggression). As noted in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, “The Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out conditions under which the Court
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.” Id.; see also Bureau of the
Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, ¶¶ 15-22,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/43 (noting that the decision was made at the Rome Conference not
to include terrorism or drug crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court due to concerns that “the inclusion of drug crimes or the crime of terrorism would
overburden the Court and detract from focusing its limited human and financial
resources on the most serious crimes agreed to in 1998”).
5. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 1 (establishing the ICC, governed by the
provisions of the statute, and granting it the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern); see also Mary Margaret Penrose,
No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous Oversight in the Development of an International
Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 621, 622 (2003) (asserting that the Rome Statute was
the principal instrument creating the ICC).
6. See Richard Goldstone, The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of
International War Criminals, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 119, 121-24 (2001) (describing the
need for a permanent international criminal court because establishing functional ad hoc
tribunals takes considerable time, leaving war criminals free from prosecution until the
wheels of justice can finally turn).
7. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, ¶¶ 267-78 (June 12, 2014) (noting the
charges brought against former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagdo and the
underlying facts giving rise to the charges); Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No.
IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
22,
2002)
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remain critical enforcement shortcomings in the current
system.8 The ICC is literally just a court, a building with judges,
lawyers, and staff, with no enforcement mechanisms to secure
arrests or effectuate sentences. A mere eight states have entered
sentencing enforcement agreements with the ICC, none within
the past three years.9 This deficiency, while not currently posing
an impediment to justice, will likely become a problem once the
ICC moves beyond a handful of convictions.10
The Assembly of States Parties to the ICC specifically
addressed the lack of cooperating states for sentence
enforcement purposes at its Thirteenth Session in December
2014.11 The Bureau of Assembly of States issued a Report of the
Bureau on Cooperation which highlighted the lack of
enforcement agreements and the lack of recent commitment by
States Parties to accept convicted individuals for enforcement
purposes.12 The Report noted that the ICC has “stressed” that ad
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.htm (indicting the
former Serbian President for, inter alia, crimes against humanity and genocide).
8. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, ICC Drops Murder and Rape Charges Against Kenyan
President, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
dec/05/crimes-humanity-charges-kenya-president-dropped-uhuru-kenyatta
(reporting
that the charges against current Kenyan head of state, Kenyatta, were withdrawn
because the Prosecutor could not secure sufficient evidence against Kenyatta due to
obstruction and lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government).
9. Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation,
¶ 22, ICC-ASP/13/29 (Nov. 21, 2014).
10. See id. (noting the Court is concerned about having only eight States Parties
participating in enforcement agreements because a range of geographical locations is
needed in order to meet the cultural and linguistic needs of sentenced persons); see also
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, QUESTION & ANSWER: THE ICC APPEALS CHAMBER CONFIRMS
THE VERDICT AND THE SENTENCE AGAINST THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO 2 (2014),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Lubanga-Q-a-A-Eng-01-12-2014.pdf
(reporting that Lubanga Dyilo had served almost two-thirds of his fourteen year
sentence in the Hague because there was still no determination as to where he would
serve his sentence); David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1
Billion,
2
Convictions,
FORBES
(Mar.
12,
2014,
2:57
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/ international-criminal-court-12years-1-billion-2-convictions-2/ (reporting that the ICC has only convicted two
individuals in its twelve year history).
11. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 20.
12. See id. ¶ 22 (highlighting that the ICC has only signed eight sentence
enforcement agreements and no further agreements have been reached since the most
recent agreement was reached three years prior).
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hoc enforcement agreements, though permissible, “were not
ideal.”13
Now that a permanent institution exists ready to prosecute
those who are most deserving of international condemnation and
punishment, it is strange that no corresponding permanent
facility exists to house those convicted by the ICC.14
Remarkably, little attention has been given to the important
realities of a permanent criminal court – prisoners facing
lengthy prison terms.15 One cannot begin to comprehensively
address international crime without addressing the full
spectrum of prosecution, from arrest and pre-trial detention to
incarceration, particularly when the primary penalty before
international criminal tribunals remains imprisonment.16
We have an international criminal court, but no coexisting
international prison.17 The maintenance of a permanent ICC
requires us to assess the viability of a criminal justice system
that fails to possess a centrally located, permanent prison
13. Id. ¶ 19.
14. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 621-22, 626, 642 (commenting that we must fix
the shortcomings of the ICC, particularly the lack of a permanent facility to house ICC
convicts); ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises Construction,
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%
20the%20court/permanent%20premises/latestnewsandcalendar/Pages/-ICC-holdsgroundbreaking-ceremony-for-Permanent-Premises-construction.aspx
(lauding
the
construction of the ICC’s permanent premises as a facility that should convey a strong
image of an institution established to impart justice and combat impunity).
15. See RÓISÍN MULGREW, TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PENAL SYSTEM 56 (2013) (noting that international criminal tribunals have the authority
to impose sentences and have final say on decisions relating to release, yet rely entirely
on volunteer states to carry such sentences out); Penrose, supra note 5, at 626
(evaluating major deficiencies in the ICC, including the lack of a permanent facility to
house ICC convicts); Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of
Detention for International War Crimes, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 553, 564, 580 (2000)
(commenting on the problem of tribunals issuing sentences up to life in prison, which
will outlast the temporary tribunals); Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12
(comparing the length and severity of sentences at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL).
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77 (listing the applicable penalties,
including imprisonment for a specified number of years – not to exceed thirty years –
and life imprisonment “when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person”); Penrose, supra note 5, at 642
(claiming that a world criminal court needs traditional components of a criminal justice
system, such as police power and incarceration facilities, in order to be successful).
17. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 626.
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capable of housing convicted war criminals and those who
committed crimes against humanity.18
Currently, all international tribunals rely on cooperating
states to voluntarily agree to accept a particular convict.19 The
list of willing states has been short and regionalized. The ICC,
much like the enforcement system utilized by the ad hoc
tribunals, continues to rely on cooperating states to help arrest
those indicted and, eventually, house the convicted.20 The lack of
enforcement mechanisms have plagued the various tribunals, as
numerous individuals have avoided trial simply by evading
arrest while others have served the majority of their sentence in
a holding cell in the Netherlands.21 Because these states’
cooperation is entirely voluntary, they can reject any individual
presented.22 Thus, the ICC has no assurance that its convicts

18. See id. at 635-42 (asserting that the international community must address the
need for the ICC to have a permanent prison facility if the Court is to be a success).
19. See, e.g., Yugoslavia Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2 & 4 (directing the
Registrar of the International Tribunal to report to the Tribunal’s President the Member
State’s willingness to accept a convicted person). The U.N. Security Council established
the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to conclude the remaining
tasks, including the enforcement of sentences facing the now dormant ICTY and ICTR.
S.C. Res. 1966, arts. 2 & 25(2) (Dec. 22, 2010). The MICT began functions relating to the
ICTR on July 1, 2012 and the ICTY on July 1, 2013. Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. Article 25 addresses
the “Enforcement of Sentences,” and Article 26 addresses “Pardon or Commutation of
Sentences.” Id. arts. 25 & 26. Article 25 of the MICT provides that “[i]mprisonment shall
be served in a State designated by the Mechanism from a list of states with which the
United Nations has agreements for this purpose. Such imprisonment shall be in
accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of
the Mechanism.” Id. art. 25.
20. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(1)(a) (“A sentence of imprisonment
shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have
indicated to the Court their willingness to accepted sentenced persons.”).
21. See Klaus Hoffmann, Some Remarks on the Enforcement of International
Sentences in Light of the Galić Case at the ICTY, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 838, 842 (2011) (Ger.) (“Already today, many perpetrators spent
a number of years during pre-trial and trial stages in the UN prison in
Scheveningen/The Hague. In case of very short prison sentences, some convicted
prisoners have never been transferred to another state of enforcement.”).
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(1)(b)-(c) (stating that a State shall
inform the Court whether it will accept a convict, and providing that a State may attach
conditions to its willingness to accept sentenced persons). Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2,
at 115 noted that there is a “double-consent” process for designating a state for sentence
enforcement, by which “first, a state must enter into an enforcement agreement with a
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will have an available state to enforce its penalties once an
individual is convicted and sentenced.23
It seems unlikely that a twenty-first century international
criminal justice system can successfully exist on a
one-dimensional level – the maintenance of a court without
corresponding police and prison enforcement mechanisms.24 The
current model is woefully incomplete, embracing the paradigm
of the past, not the modern world.25 We have abandoned the ad
hoc tribunal approach, recognizing its shortcomings. We have
embraced the need for a permanent international criminal
justice system.26 Why then, do we continue to use an ad hoc,
cooperating states model to mete out penalties imposed by a
permanent criminal court?27 Historical deficiencies suggest the
time is ripe to consider whether an international prison system
is a necessary component of the nascent ICC system.28
This Article asserts that a permanent international prison is
a necessary, if not indispensable, component of any effective
international criminal justice system. It begins by first

tribunal and express its willingness to enforce sentences in [the] future and second,
these states agree to accept the individual convicts on an ad hoc basis.”
23. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(4) (“If no State is designated . . . the
sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a prison facility made available by the host
State.”).
24. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 625-26 (arguing that because the ICC lacks a
coercive enforcement mechanism and permanent prison system, the Court is destined for
limited success).
25. See id. at 642 (arguing that by maintaining the inadequate enforcement and
imprisonment mechanisms that plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC is not sufficiently
capable of enforcing international criminal law).
26. See generally Duane W. Krohnke, International Criminal Justice: Winding
down Two Ad-Hoc Criminal Tribunals, DWKCOMMENTARIES (June 18, 2011), http://
dwkcommentaries.com/2011/06/18/international-criminal-justice-winding-down-two-adhoc-criminal-tribunals/ (discussing the phasing out of the ICTY and ICTR and how the
ICC solves some of those tribunals’ shortcomings).
27. See, e.g., Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (arguing that the ICC should implement
the “traditional components of a criminal justice system” to avoid dependence on the
political influences of the participating states).
28. See Róisín Mulgrew, On the Enforcement of Sentences Imposed by International
Courts: Challenges Faced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
373, 395-96 (2009) (noting that a lack of support from participating states has made
SCSL enforcement difficult and that the creation of an international prison system needs
to be considered).
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addressing the historical approach to international sentencing.
Next, it discusses the inadequacies of the status quo. Finally, it
argues the time has come to construct a permanent
international prison, rather than adhere to the ad hoc approach
in dealing with international criminals and convicts.
II.
THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
SENTENCING: FROM NUREMBERG TO THE COOPERATING
STATES MODEL
Following the United Nations’ creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)29 and, shortly
thereafter, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR),30 the international community convicted its first
international war criminals since the Nuremberg Trials and the
Tokyo Tribunal following World War II.31 But, unlike the World
War II courts that relied upon the Allied occupation to carry out
the penalties, including imprisonment and executions, the
modern international system has no single entity tasked with
overseeing the enforcement of prison sentences.32 While the
victorious Allies were able to utilize existing prison facilities in
Germany and Japan, the ICTY and ICTR had no such luxury.33
Instead, the ICTY and ICTR were forced to rely on cooperating
states to aid in the enforcement of these court’s criminal
sentences, all of which are strictly limited to terms of
imprisonment.34

29. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (creating the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia).
30. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, ¶ 1 (creating the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda).
31. See generally About the ICTY, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia,
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (showing that the ICTY and
ICTR were the first criminal tribunals to be established since the criminal tribunals in
Nuremberg and Japan).
32. See Penrose, supra note 15, at 565-66 (detailing that the sentences handed
down during the Nuremberg Trials were overseen by the Allies, while the enforcement of
ICTY and ICTR sentences are governed by both the tribunal and the host state).
33. See id.
34. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 27 (stating that imprisonment shall be
served in a cooperating state, and that “imprisonment shall be in accordance with the
applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International
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Likewise, while the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
contains a statutory preference for enforcing sentences within
Sierra Leone,35 the realities of the situation in a povertystricken, post-conflict nation state has precluded this from
occurring.36 So, the SCSL, much like the ICTY and ICTR,
“cannot directly implement its own sanctions” due solely to the
lack of a functioning prison facility.37 As a result, all SCSL
convicts have been placed outside Sierra Leone to serve out their
respective sentences.38
In contrast to the modern ad hoc tribunals, the early
international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo provided
centralized prison space to enforce the international criminal
sentences imposed.39 Following the World War II tribunals, that
space remained in the conquered territories of Germany and
Japan.40 Modernly, however, the ICC, much like the ICTY and
Tribunal”); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, art. 26 (limiting place of imprisonment to “any of
the States on a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their
willingness to accept convicted persons”).
35. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the
Residual
Special
Court
for
Sierra
Leone,
art.
23(1)
(2010),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/
RSCSL%20Agreement%20and%20Statute.pdf
[hereinafter RSCSL Statute]; Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374.
36. Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374.
37. Id.
38. See id. (stating that SCSL has to rely on third-party states to accept custody of
SCSL prisoners); Rwanda Signs Prisoner Deal with Sierra Leone Court, ICC OBSERVERS
(Mar. 21, 2009), http://iccobservers.wordpress.com/tag/special-court-for-sierra-leone/
(noting that SCSL convicts are being sent to Mpanga Prison in Rwanda); Distance from
Uganda to Sierra Leone, DISTANCEFROMTO (last visited Oct. 28, 2015),
http://distancefromto.net/distance-from/Uganda/to/Sierra+Leone (showing that Uganda,
where Mpanga prison is located, is 3,070 miles from Sierra Leone); Liberian Charles
Taylor Moved to British Prison to Serve War Crimes Conviction, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 15,
2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
liberia/ 10380401/Liberian-Charles-Taylor-moved-to-British-prison-to-serve-war-crimesconviction.html (detailing that the lone exception to sending its prisoners to Mpanga is
Charles Taylor, who was sent to the United Kingdom to serve his sentence).
39. See Penrose, supra note 15, at 564-65 (stating that unlike the current
tribunals, convicts from the Nuremberg and Tokyo served their entire sentences at their
respective facilities).
40. See SPANDAU, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/place/Spandau#
ref980279 (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) (detailing that the Spandau prison located near
Berlin housed the Nazi War Criminals until the last one died in 1987); The Tribunal –
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ICTR before it, does not possess an occupied territory and must
defer to the willingness of other cooperating states to effectuate
its sentences.41 This decentralized approach to imprisonment
has implications beyond mere location of prison space. The
absence of a cohesive international prison system raises
complications relating to family access, language difficulties,
and rehabilitation, thereby potentially undermining the
ultimate efficacy of international justice.
While the ICTY and ICTR initially prohibited imprisonment
in either Yugoslavia or Rwanda, a domestic solution was
successfully used during World War II due to the occupying
nations controlling the prison facilities. This local approach has
been incorporated into one modern international tribunal.42 The
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a
United Nations-backed domestic court tasked with investigating
and prosecuting crimes relating to the Khmer Rouge regime of
the 1970s, has adopted a domestic sentencing approach for its
convicts.43 Much like the World War II tribunals, the ECCC will

An Overview, TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL – A DIGITAL EXHIBITION,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/ imtfe/tribunal (last visited Oct. 28, 2015) (stating that all the
war criminals in the Military Tribunal were sent to and died in Sugamo Prison in
Tokyo).
41. See supra notes 20 & 34 and accompanying text.
42. See Kaing Guek Eav Transferred to Kandal Prison, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
IN
THE
COURTS
OF
CAMBODIA
(June
18,
2013,
2:33
PM),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/ kaing-guek-eav-transferred-kandal-prision (detailing
that the ECCC is a domestic legal system in which Cambodian authorities are
responsible for the imprisonment of those individuals convicted by the ECCC); Penrose,
supra note 15 (showing that the Nuremberg Tribunal had the Allies oversee the
enforcement of their sentences while the Tokyo Tribunal had the U.S. Army oversee the
enforcement of their sentences).
43. See About ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc. The ECCC was created
by Cambodian law to address crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime
between the years 1975-1979. Id. “The government of Cambodia insisted that, for the
sake of the Cambodian people, the trial must be held in Cambodia using Cambodian
staff and judges together with foreign personnel.” Id. Still, the ECCC utilizes a
cooperative approach between national law and the United Nations. Id. See generally
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
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place its inmates directly in domestic prisons,44 which will
provide far easier transitions relating to language, religion,
access to counsel and visitation issues. To date, only one person,
Kaing Guek Eav, has been found guilty, sentenced by the ECCC,
and transferred to Kandal Provincial Prison in Cambodia.45
Thus, there is little evidence of how the domestic model
performs in modern society.46 But, if past experiences with
Spandau prison in Berlin, Germany47 and Sugamo prison in
Tokyo48 are any indication, the domestic model at least offers the
44. See Kaing Guek Eav Transferred to Kandal Prison, supra note 42 (detailing
that the ECCC is a domestic legal system in which Cambodian authorities are
responsible for the imprisonment of those individuals convicted by the ECCC).
45. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001, Appeal
Judgment, pt. VIII, at 320 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia July 26,
2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/Case% 20001Appeal
JudgementEn.pdf (upholding convictions for crimes against humanity and war crimes
but overturning the sentence of thirty-five years and replacing it with life
imprisonment). Two others, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, have been found guilty and
received life sentences; they are currently in a detention center waiting for their appeals
to be heard. Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea & Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/01, Judgement,
¶ 20 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-08-07%2017:04/E313_
Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_ 01_ENG.pdf; Chris Blake & Kevin
Doyle, Khmer Rouge Leaders Sentenced to Life in Jail for War Crimes, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 7, 2014, 1:18 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-07/khmerrouge-leaders-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-war-crimes.
46. See International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts, GLOB. POLICY
FORUM
(last
visited
Oct.
28,
2015),
http://globalpolicy.org/internationaljustice/international-criminal-tribunals-and-special-courts.html (listing the Special
Courts in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia, and East Timor as the only international
criminal tribunals to develop after those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia); see also Nuon Chea
and Khieu Samphan Sentenced to Life Imprisonment for Crimes Against Humanity,
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/nuon-chea-and-khieu-samphan-sentenced-lifeimprisonment-crimes-against-humanity (detailing that two additional defendants, Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan have both been convicted of crimes against humanity and
have been sentenced by the ECCC Trial Chamber to life in prison); Lauren Crothers,
Khmer Rouge Leaders Appeal Life Sentences for Crimes Against Humanity, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 30, 2014, 4:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/sep/30/khmer-rougeleaders-appeal-life-sentences-crimes-humanity (stating that Chea and Samphan filed a
notice of appeal).
47. SPANDAU, supra note 40.
48. BILL BARRETTE, ART AND EXCHANGE AT SUGAMO PRISON, 1945-52, JAPAN POL’Y
RES. INST. OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 33 (Oct. 2004), http://www.jpri.org/publications/
occasionalpapers/op33.html.
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benefits of a common language, a common culture, and better
access to family.
Perhaps recognizing the inherent limitations of a pure
cooperating states model, the ICC has adopted a hybrid
approach that relies primarily on willing states to house its
convicts but also provides that in a given case, where no such
nation state provides its acquiescence, the ICC Host State, the
Netherlands, will accommodate the convict in a domestic
prison.49 The ICC’s statutory design accepts there may be
instances where it is impossible to secure a cooperating state
placement. The creation of this safety net implicitly
acknowledges that the cooperating state model offers an
incomplete solution, at best, and provides further evidence that
a new, more permanent system should be achieved. The lack of
state cooperation was further addressed at the ICC when the
Review Conference recently added the option that
“imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available
in the designated State through an international or regional
organization, mechanism or agency.”50
What remains surprising, in light of the lack of state
cooperation spanning from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC, is
that the international community has not pressed the need for
an alternative to the status quo. It has made no discernable
movement toward a permanent international prison. The
primary shortcoming of the cooperating states model is that only
a small number of nation states participate, which results in a
sparse, regionalized approach to incarceration.51 Few nation

49. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 103(4) (stating that “if no State is
designated [for enforcement of the sentence], the sentence of imprisonment shall be
served in a prison facility made available by the host State”); id. art. 3(1) (establishing
the Netherlands as “the host State”).
50. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
ICC Res. RC/Res.3, ¶ 2 (June 8, 2010) (noting the ICC’s mindfulness “of the need for
broader participation of States in the enforcement of sentences in order to allow for such
enforcement in all relevant regions and sub regions”).
51. See Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22 (stating that the
Bureau only has eight States that have signed sentence enforcement agreements);
Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 395 (observing that “with many of the difficulties relating to
enforcement being attributable to the lack of support from states, it is perhaps time for
international courts to take direct control over the implementation of their sanctions”).
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states have expressed willingness to receive international
convicts from these international tribunals, with most accepting
countries being regionally concentrated in Europe and Africa.52
The continents of Asia, Australia, and the Americas (with the
exception of Colombia) have, thus far, failed to contribute prison
space or facilities to enforce internationally imposed sentences.53
Russia, too, has withheld its cooperation from the international
tribunals, though several Eastern European countries have
entered enforcement agreements.54 Simply put, the majority of
the world’s governments and population have decided not to
cooperate.55
Thus, part of the ICC’s efficacy, assuming that prosecutions
and sentences become more common, will depend on whether
there are sufficient nation states willing to house, service, and
rehabilitate convicted individuals.56 Currently, there have only

52. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that fifty-seven persons
convicted by the ICTY, ICTR, or SCSL are serving their sentences “in various European
and African countries”).
53. Cf. Bilateral Agreements, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://unictr.unmict.
org/en/documents/bilateral-agreements (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (showing that only
eight countries entered bilateral agreements with the ICTR to enforce sentences: Mali
(1999), Benin (1999), Swaziland (2000), France (2004), Italy (2004), Sweden (2004),
Rwanda (2008), and Senegal (2010)); Member States Cooperation, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/documents/member-states-cooperation (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (listing the sixteen countries that have entered into bilateral
agreements to enforce ICTY sentences).
54. See Member States Cooperation, supra note 53. Sixteen countries, including
Eastern European countries, have entered bilateral agreements with the ICTY to enforce
sentences, but Russia has not. Id. The countries that have entered bilateral agreements
with the ICTY include: Italy (1997), Finland (1997), Norway (1998), Austria (1999),
Sweden (1999), France (2000), Spain (2000), Denmark (2002), United Kingdom (2004),
Belgium (2007), Ukraine (2007), Portugal (2007), Estonia (2008), Slovakia (2008), Poland
(2008), and Albania (2008). Id.
55. See supra notes 20-22 & 53 and accompanying text.
56. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 378 (explaining that states must be willing to
house international convicts). A criticism – not without force – is that the work of the
ICC has been slow and costly. See Davenport, supra note 10 (explaining the ICC’s low
conviction rate and high operation cost). The ICC has been in existence for twelve years,
has received approximately $1 billion in operating costs, and has two convictions to date.
Id. This pace does not fortify the call for any prison, much less an international prison.
See id. (stating the ICC is too expensive to justify). Rather, as David Davenport argues,
this funding “would be better utilized to strengthen national and regional criminal
justice” systems. Id.

2-Penrose FINAL (Do Not Delete)

438

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/18/2016 9:53 PM

[Vol. 38:2

been two final convictions before the ICC.57 Both sentences are
being enforced by their domestic country, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, through ad hoc agreements rather than
in any “cooperating state” with a prior ICC sentencing
agreement.58
The ICC constricts a cooperating state’s power to reduce
sentences until “the person has served two thirds of the
sentence, or twenty five years in the case of life imprisonment.”59
Similarly, the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
(“MICT”) now uses a “rule of thumb” that convicts are eligible
for early release once they have served two-thirds of their
sentence.60 But, even with the “two-thirds” approach, the
governing laws of a particular cooperating state may be at odds
with ICC and MICT practices. A far more predictable and
certain approach would be to create a truly international prison
system, so that decisions relating to release and rehabilitation
are standardized for all international convicts through policies
57. Davenport, supra note 10. The conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo became
final when the Appeals Chamber confirmed the verdict and fourteen-year sentence on
December 1, 2014. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on
the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against his Conviction, ¶ 529 (Dec. 1, 2014).
The other conviction involves Congolese militia leader Germain Katanga, who was
sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment by Trial Chamber II on May 23, 2014.
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to
Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 170 (May 23, 2014).
58. Both men have been transferred to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
serve their twelve- and fourteen-year sentences. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga,
ICC-01/04-01/07, Ad Hoc Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the International Criminal Court on Enforcement of the
Sentence of the International Criminal Court Imposed on Mr. Germain Katanga (Nov.
24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2179227.pdf; Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Ad Hoc Agreement Between the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the International Criminal Court on Enforcement
of the Sentence of the International Criminal Court Imposed on Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2179222.pdf; see also Press
Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga Transferred to
the DRC to Serve their Sentences of Imprisonment, ICC Press Release PR1181 (Dec. 19,
2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
Pages/pr1181.aspx.
59. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 110.
60. See Jonathan H. Choi, Early Release in International Criminal Law, 123 YALE
L.J. 1784, 1788 (2013) (noting convicts presumptively only need to serve two-thirds of
their sentence to be eligible for early release).
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created and enforced by an international prison.61 While the ICC
and MICT remain the final word on release issues, having a
single international entity (particularly one with international
prisoner expertise) provide recommendations on release would
be an improvement over the status quo.62
In over a decade of existence, with only two final convictions,
the ICC has little current need for actual prison space. But, the
permanence of the ICC, coupled with its ongoing investigations
and prosecutions, suggests that more convictions will occur in
the future.63 Because war crimes and crimes against humanity
tend to be carried out by large groups of people, a given conflict
can produce several defendants. If this remains true, a present
or future conflict could produce an abrupt uptake in convictions.
If the ICC hits a critical mass of sentenced individuals, will
there be a sufficient number of countries willing to accept and
bear the cost of housing ICC convicts? The resolution of this
question, coupled with the shortcomings in the status quo,
strengthen the case for the creation of a truly international
prison.
III.
A.

SHORTCOMINGS IN THE STATUS QUO

The Lack of Cooperating States

The ICTY,64 ICTR,65 and SCSL66 have ceased their official
business, turning over all future activity to the MICT67 or, in the

61. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 59(4), 60(2), 81(3)(b)-(c) (outlining
the discretionary powers the ICC grants to courts to decide certain questions of release of
prisoners in limited circumstances).
62. See id.
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (listing the ICC’s various ongoing
cases). Currently, the ICC reports it has twenty three ongoing cases. Id. In addition, the
ICC is investigating nine distinct situations that could yield numerous defendants. Id.
From Uganda to the recent investigation opened involving Israel’s treatment of the
Palestinians, there is an understanding that the ICC’s judicial footprint will grow in the
coming years. Id.
64. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, ¶ 1 (establishing that the International
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would begin functioning for the ICTY on July 1,
2013).
65. See id. (indicating the MICT began functioning for the ICTR on July 1, 2012).
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case of the SCSL, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“RSCSL”).68 All outstanding business, including potential
future trials which would have fallen within the jurisdiction of
the ad hoc tribunals, has been transferred to the MICT69 and
RSCSL.70 The most important remaining business continues to
be oversight of the criminal sentences imposed by each of these
ad hoc tribunals, including questions of early release.71
Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council granted power
to the MICT and RSCSL to oversee the remaining functions of
the ad hoc tribunals after their respective mandates expired.72
This obligation includes designating potential enforcement
states and determining questions of pardon and early release.73
The MICT and RSCSL, just as the ICTY and ICTR before them,
maintain Practice Directions to help guide these early release
decisions.74 In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals, the RSCSL has
66. The SCSL closed in 2013 and was replaced by the Residual Special Court for
Sierra Leone (RSCSL). Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1
(2010) [hereinafter Agreement to Establish RSCSL]; The Mandate of the Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/RSCSLMandate.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
67. Security Council Establishes Residual Mechanism to Conclude Tasks of
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia, UNITED NATIONS
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10141.doc.htm [hereinafter Security
Council Establishes Residual Mechanism].
68. The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background,
supra note 66.
69. See About the MICT, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBS., http://www.
unmict.org/en/about (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (“Securing the arrest, transfer and
prosecution of the nine remaining fugitives still wanted for trial by the ICTR is a top
priority for the Mechanism.”).
70. The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background,
supra note 66.
71. See id. (stating that the authority of RSCSL to manage requests for review of
convictions and acquittals may extend until 2055).
72. Security Council Establishes Residual Mechanism, supra note 67. The MICT
was initially put into place for a period of four years with a review scheduled every two
years thereafter. Id.
73. S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, arts. 25-26; RSCSL Statute, supra note 35,
arts. 23-24.
74. See generally Mechanism for Int’l Crim. Tribs., Practice Direction on the
Procedure for Designation of the State in Which a Convicted Person Is to Serve His or Her
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noted in its Practice Direction that inmates are not eligible for
early release prior to serving two-thirds of their sentence.75 And,
while the MICT Practice Direction suggests that domestic law in
the enforcing state triggers eligibility for early release,76 one
source notes the MICT has adopted the two thirds rule as an
informal governing principle.77
As of November 19, 2014, the MICT was overseeing the
enforcement of 18 sentences on behalf of the ICTY, with inmates
spread over twelve countries, and twenty nine sentences on
behalf of the ICTR split between only two African countries.78
The MICT reported that sixteen ICTR convicts were serving
their sentences in Mali, and thirteen more were in Benin.79 In
contrast, the eighteen ICTY convicts were all serving their
sentences in European states including “Austria (1), Belgium
Sentence of Imprisonment, ¶ 1, MICT/2 Rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter MICT Practice
Direction, Designation of State] (establishing an internal procedure for MICT’s
“designation of the State in which a convicted person is to serve his or her sentence of
imprisonment”); Mechanism for Int’l Crim. Tribs., Practice Direction on the Procedure for
the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and Early
Release of Persons Convicted by the ICTR, the ICTY or the Mechanism, ¶ 1, MICT/3 (July
5, 2012) [hereinafter MICT Practice Direction, Early Release] (establishing an internal
procedure for MICT’s “determination of applications for pardon, commutation of
sentence, and early release of persons convicted by the respective Tribunal or by the
Mechanism”); Special Court for Sierra Leone, Practice Direction on the Conditional Early
Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 2 (Jan. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release] (providing criteria in determining a
convicted person’s eligibility for conditional early release).
75. SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, ¶ 2(A).
76. The Practice Direction section on “Notification of Eligibility” indicates that
“[u]pon the convicted person becoming eligible for pardon, commutation of sentence or
early release under the law of the State in which the convicted person is serving his or her
sentence (the “enforcing State”), the enforcing State shall . . . notify the Mechanism
accordingly.” MICT Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, ¶ 2 (emphasis
added). See also S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 26 (“If, pursuant to the applicable law
of the State in which the person convicted by the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism is
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State
concerned shall notify the Mechanism accordingly.” (emphasis added)).
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. Assessment and Progress Rep. of the President of the Int’l Residual Mechanism
for Crim. Tribs. (2014), Judge Theodor Meron, for the Period From 16 May to 19
November 2014, transmitted by Letter Dated 19 November 2014 from the President of
the Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribs. Addressed to the President of the Sec.
Council, ¶¶ 43-44, U.N. Doc. S/2014/826 (Nov. 19, 2014).
79. Id. ¶ 43.

2-Penrose FINAL (Do Not Delete)

442

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/18/2016 9:53 PM

[Vol. 38:2

(1), Denmark (2), Estonia (3), Finland (1), France (1), Germany
(3), Italy (1), Norway (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1) and Sweden
(2).”80 Six ICTR convicts and two ICTY convicts are still being
housed at the detention units in Arusha and the Hague,
respectively.81 All existing bilateral agreements entered into by
the ad hoc tribunals continue in force for the MICT.82
The MICT, like each international tribunal preceding it,
continues – somewhat in vain – to call on the cooperation of
states to help secure additional agreements for the enforcement
of sentences.83 No new state that had not previously provided
prison space for the enforcement of sentences to either the ICTY
or ICTR has entered into a bilateral agreement with the MICT.84
This inertia underscores the need for change, permanent
change.
The lack of participating states under the cooperating states
model continues to be a problem.85 Every ad hoc court, the
MICT, and now the ICC continue to call on states to aid in the
enforcement of sentences, generally to little avail.86 If states
refuse to step up and accept these international prisoners, the
system of international criminal justice will face a serious threat
to its future endeavors. In the Bureau of the Assembly of States
Parties Report of the Bureau on Cooperation, the Bureau
exposed the second main shortcoming to the existing model: a
lack of sufficient diversity to accommodate the sentencing
enforcement needs. The Report asserts:
80. Id. ¶ 44.
81. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
82. See id. ¶ 41 (“The agreements concluded by the United Nations for the two
Tribunals remain in force for the Mechanism.”).
83. See id. (“The Mechanism relies on the cooperation of States for the enforcement
of sentences.”).
84. See Member State Agreements, U.N. MECHANISM INT’L CRIM. TRIBS.,
http://www. unmict.org/en/basic-documents (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (demonstrating
that only the pre-existing enforcement agreements with the ICTY and ICTR remain in
effect – no new member state agreements are reported).
85. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22.
86. Id.; Int’l Residual Mechanism for Crim. Tribs., Second Annual Rep., ¶ 66, U.N.
Doc. A/69/226-S/2014/555 (Aug. 1, 2014) (“The Mechanism actively sought the
cooperation of existing enforcement States in enforcing the sentences of the two
Tribunals and continued efforts to negotiate additional agreements with States in order
to increase its enforcement capacity.”).
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The Court would wish to have a broad range of
agreements in different geographical areas and
different normative regimes, so as to be ready to
determine enforcements. This would allow the Court to
meet the cultural and linguistic needs for sentenced
persons, including for the families of the individuals
concerned.87
The continuing business of the ad hoc tribunals consumes
scarce incarceration resources.88 Amnesty International
specifically noted, prior to the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of
States Parties to the Rome Statute in December 2014, that the
need to secure cooperating states for the enforcement of
sentences remains acute.89 In fact, Amnesty echoed the concern
first reported by the Bureau that only eight states have thus far
entered enforcement agreements, with no new state entering
into such an agreement in the past three years.90 This dearth of
cooperation has existed for each of the modern international
tribunals, from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC. Simply put, the
cooperating states model has proven a constant struggle.
B.

Conditions, Distance, Language, Security and Cultural
Distinctions

A second shortcoming in the cooperating states model is the
reality that the prisons made available by the few cooperating
states vary dramatically from inmate to inmate.91 The
conditions, rehabilitation opportunities, and other penal issues

87. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22.
88. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374 (“Despite the statutory preference for
enforcement of SCSL sentences in Sierra Leone, the host state is not in a position to
accept custody of SCSL prisoners[,]” but rather must “rely on third states for the
implementation of its sentences.”); Hoffmann, supra note 21, at 841-42 (raising the
question “whether it would not be preferable to establish a truly international prison
with a set of international rules for imprisonment”).
89. AMNESTY INT’L, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2014), https://www.
amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/ior530102014en.pdf.
90. Id.
91. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118-19 (illustrating that because “the
law of the tribunals is virtually silent regarding the type of prisons international
convicts shall be sent to,” the determination lies “with domestic authorities and arguably
differs by state, but also by convict”).
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are matters largely left to the discretion of individual states.92
As Professors Holá and van Wijk observe:
Whether an international prisoner is placed in a high
security prison, protective custody, regular prison, or
for example, an open prison, has a [sic] great
consequences for his daily life and influences the
execution of his/her sentence to a considerable extent.
The law of the tribunals is virtually silent regarding the
type of prisons international convicts shall be sent to.93
The governing statutes merely mandate conformance with basic
international standards.94 But, most germane issues are
resolved locally and can vary quite dramatically from country to
country and even prison to prison.95
One would expect that the international community would
strive to provide similar imprisonment conditions to those
convicted of the same crime or even in the same conflict.
However, the status quo depends fully on the cooperation of
states that are free to receive only certain individuals and,
thereafter, can place the individual in varying types of custody,
which need only satisfy basic international norms. Such
deviations are problematic and result in some inmates’
sentences carrying harsher conditions than others. Two ICTY
convicts might receive the exact same sentence of fifteen years.
But, depending on the prison conditions they face, their
experiences may be markedly different.96

92. See id. at 121-22, 125-26 (explaining that international prisoners are generally
“incorporated into domestic prison populations[,]” where they are evaluated under the
Presidents’ discretion and offered rehabilitation programs of the State).
93. Id. at 119.
94. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 106(1) (“The enforcement of a
sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the Court and shall be
consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of
prisoners.”).
95. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118-22 (differentiating between
European countries like Norway, where inmates are housed in smaller facilities, usually
including an individual prison cell, and Italy or France, where inmates generally face
issues related to overcrowding and are housed in shared prison cells).
96. See id. at 120 (detailing that one ICTY convict in Finland has been allowed to
serve his sentence in an “open prison,” described by the author as “a facility without any
walls”).
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One common feature of all international convicts, excepting
the two ICC convicts, is that they have been designated to serve
their sentences in locations far from the international convict’s
home nation.97 The SCSL convicts housed in Rwanda are nearly
3,000 miles from home.98 Even for the wealthiest individuals,
opportunities to maintain relations with friends and family
members imprisoned 3,000 miles away require a choice of
relocation to an unfamiliar country or constant travel, which
carries burdens of both time and expense.99 As previously
mentioned, the cooperating states model has resulted in
seventeen different European states willing to accept ICTY
convicts (thirteen of which are actually housing prisoners) and
two African states, Mali and Benin, willing to accept ICTR
convicts (roughly 2,700 miles from Rwanda).100 In Europe, ICTY
convicts are often integrated into the local prison population and
serve side by side with individuals convicted of domestic
crimes.101 SCSL convicts, in contrast, due largely to financial
support from the Netherlands, have uniformly been placed in a
special prison wing in Rwanda (a location nearly 3,000 miles

97. See id. at 118 (stating that the “majority of ICTR prisoners” are designated to
serve their sentences in Mali and Benin, and SCSL prisoners are designated to serve in
Rwanda); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385-86 (noting the “very real risk that
international sentences of imprisonment served in a decentralized system may be
excessively isolating”).
98. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that although the SCSL
entered into an enforcement agreement with four countries, all convicts except one are
serving their sentences in Rwanda).
99. See Jessica M. Kelder et al., Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of
International Crimes: A Case Study of the ICTY and ICTR, 14 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1177,
1190 (2014) (“As it is more difficult for families to visit, convicts complain that is it
difficult to maintain close contact with relatives or partners.”). Special rules relating to
visits have, however, been put in place for some international convicts, but, like all other
instances of imprisonment, vary from country to country. See Holá & van Wijk, supra
note 2, at 120 (explaining that “national authorities may provide special treatment for
international prisoners,” such as Norway or France, which allow special arrangements
for visiting hours “to allow the prisoners to spend as much time as possible with their
family within the limited timeframe available”).
100. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 117-18.
101. Id. at 120.
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from Sierra Leone) and are kept separated from domestic
inmates.102
Unlike domestic prisons, which can also be a great distance
from one’s village or town, the cooperating states model requires
that family members traverse borders, not simply miles. And,
for those imprisoned on the African continent, the distances
between “home” and the prison facilities in Mali, Benin, and
Rwanda are close to 3,000 miles away.103 For some international
inmates and their families, separation covering such vast
distances has endangered the continuation of meaningful family
relations.104
Another common feature under the status quo for
individuals serving their sentences abroad is that the host
countries often have different languages, cultures, and
customs.105 In nearly every case, it is unlikely the international
convict or his or her family will speak the language of the
enforcing state, which can make communicating with guards,
physicians, spiritual advisors, and prison staff problematic.
Language shortcomings further limit an international convict’s
ability to participate in rehabilitation programs, including
educational opportunities or training programs.106 Such
linguistic issues may even impair a family’s ability to familiarize

102. Id. at 118; see also Distance from Rwanda to Sierra Leone, DISTANCEFROMTO,
http://www.distancefromto.net/distance-from/Rwanda/to/Sierra+Leone
(last
visited
Mar. 27, 2016) (calculating the distance between Sierra Leone and Rwanda at 2,957
miles). The lone SCSL exception for sentencing purposes has been Charles Taylor. Holá
& van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118. His unique situation is discussed in the text more fully
below.
103. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that the ICTR sends the
“vast majority” of Rwandan convicts to Mali and Benin to serve their sentences, and that
the SCSL sends “[a]ll its [Sierra Leone] convicts” to Rwanda to serve their sentences).
104. See, e.g., id. at 120 (detailing a prisoner in France who “was never visited by
his family for four and a half years . . . due to practical obstacles such as costs of
travelling and housing or visa requirements”).
105. Id. at 118.
106. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, 389 (observing that participation in prison
programs “requires a high degree of competency in the national language of the
enforcing state”); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (underscoring that “language
barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations,
inability to participate in work or education programmes [and] problems in
communicating with other prisoners, prison staff or the outside world”).
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itself with the prison rules, thereby limiting or hampering
visitation and communications.107 If educational classes are
offered only in the enforcing state’s language, which most are,
the international convict may find him or herself without access
to otherwise available classes.108 The inability to communicate
an inmate’s basic needs on a regular basis places that individual
at a serious handicap during his or her incarceration.109 Further,
unless the prison provides individualized rules and regulations
tailored to the inmate’s native language, he or she may be
unable to read governing policies or easily file a complaint or
request services due to linguistic barriers in prison forms and
policies. Even if a complaint is raised or a hearing held, unless
the inmate is provided an interpreter, he or she may be at a
severe disadvantage during the proceedings, particularly in
relation to domestic prisoners.
The contrast is stark between the World War II tribunals,
which housed inmates in two prisons where inmates spoke a
common language, and the modern cooperating states model.110
At Nuremberg and Tokyo, convicts remained in their home
countries, close to their families and with a familiar culture and
language.111 The modern system jettisoned a local confinement
107. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 (“Though the procedures for arranging
visits in enforcing states are public, relatives may not speak the languages in which the
literature is published.”); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (finding that “language
barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations,” which
inhibit the communication between prison staff and family members wanting to visit or
maintain close contact with convicts).
108. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 389 (illustrating that prisoners without a
“high degree of competency in the national language of the enforcing state” will be less
likely to participate in the programs); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (explaining
how “language barriers” effectively “negatively impact[] the prisoners’ abilities to
integrate in prison or rehabilitate”).
109. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 641 (“One of the more important requirements of
any prison setting, at least from a human rights perspective, is that inmates retain the
opportunity to convey their needs and concern to prison staff.”).
110. Penrose, supra note 15, at 555 & 555 n.9.
111. The International Military Tribunal was established in Nuremberg, Germany
“to prosecute and punish” Nazi political and military leaders and the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East was created in Tokyo, Japan “to try and punish”
Japanese political and military leaders. Milestones: 1945-1952: The Nuremberg Trial and
the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg (last visited Mar.
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approach, due, in part, to the fact that the tribunals were a
United Nations’ creation, established in nation states other than
where the conflict arose, and are not the product of a group of
conquering allies. While the practice directions for the
international tribunals regularly state the Registrar shall
address the familial relations and linguistic skills of a particular
convict and further mandates that the President “shall take into
account the desirability of serving sentences in States within
close proximity or accessibility of the relative of the convicted
person,” these directions have proven to be of little benefit when
only a handful of states have entered enforcement agreements
with the tribunals.112
Exporting those who have been convicted by an
international tribunal has proven no easy task. Róisín Mulgrew
and others have argued that the cooperating states model
exacerbates the conditions of confinement by sending the
convicted war criminals to distant locations where the lack of
family, friends, a common language or culture, and even
familiar cuisine are notably absent.113 There is an element of
isolation to these incarcerations as many international convicts
are placed in foreign prisons without programs or support
systems tailored to their language, culture, or circumstances.114
Even though international convicts often receive the benefit
of higher living standards for their imprisonment, such
protections come at the price of distance and isolation.115 These
31, 2016); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 391 (finding that familial relations are
obviously far easier to maintain if an individual is incarcerated in his home State).
112. MICT Practice Direction, Designation of State, supra note 74, ¶¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5;
Rwanda Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3(i), 3(v), 4; Yugoslavia Practice Direction,
supra note 1, ¶¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5; Sierra Leone Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4(i), 4(v),
5.
113. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining SCSL prisoners receive
less visits from family and may experience “socio-cultural isolation”); Kelder et al., supra
note 99, at 1190 (explaining ICTY prisoners face cultural difficulties and receive fewer
visits from relatives).
114. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190-91 (explaining the lack of
rehabilitation programs tailored to international convicts).
115. See id. at 1190 (“Serving a sentence in a foreign country typically has a
negative impact on the ability of prisoners to reintegrate into society as they become
socially isolated in prison.”). A good example of this distinction is the domestic Rwandan
prisoners housed in the same facility with the SCSL convicts, but living in a separate
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higher incarceration standards, which are based on key
international human rights documents, though important, fall
far short of equalizing the fact that the international convict is
being housed in a location foreign to him in every conceivable
sense of the word.116 For example, Charles Taylor, the only
SCSL convict currently held outside of Africa, requested that he
be imprisoned in Rwanda, where other international inmates
are currently being held.117 After being sent to the United
Kingdom and denied transfer to Rwanda, Taylor complained he
was being denied “a right to family life” as his relatives were not
granted visas.118 Taylor contended that a prison sentence in
Rwanda would be safer for him and less expensive for his
family.119 Finally, Taylor argued that his confinement to the
hospital wing was “effectively in isolation” because he is “too
much of a target and too vulnerable to be accommodated within
the general prison population” of the Frankland prison in
Durham, England where he is being held.120 Taylor’s final plea
for an African placement was the need to be located in a prison
where he shared “a cultural affinity” with others.121 The RSCSL
denied his request.122
wing with different standards of living and protection. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note
2, at 120 (noting that African prisons contain an international wing). International
prisons must be kept in a location where international prison standards are honored. See
id. at 118 (explaining that enforcement agreements require prisons to adhere to
international standards). The same protection is not always afforded to domestic
inmates. See id. at 120 (discussing the special international wing of the Rwandan
prison).
116. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 131 (describing the unique
circumstances foreign prisoners encounter despite protections provided by international
law).
117. Liberia’s Charles Taylor Prefers Rwandan Jail to UK, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24520489.
118. Taylor filed a lengthy motion with the Residual Court for the SCSL on
June 13, 2014. Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United
Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda ¶ 3, In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No.
SCSL-03-01-ES (June 13, 2014).
119. Id. ¶¶ 5, 37-38.
120. Id. ¶ 4.
121. Id. ¶ 55.
122. In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES, Decision on Charles
Ghankay Taylor’s Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United
Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda, ¶ 38 (May 21, 2015).
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Taylor’s situation provides a concrete example of the
cultural dimension and shortcomings relating to sentencing
enforcement. The incident regarding Radislav Krstic, an ICTY
convict, provides a similar example of the security shortcomings
in the status quo.123
C.

Security

Beyond limited access to family, friends, familiar foods,
culture, and religious practices, there is evidence that security
risks for these international convicts are higher when comingled
with domestic inmates.124 Radislav Krstić, an ICTY convict of
Serbian heritage, suffered severe injuries after being repeatedly
stabbed by three British Muslim inmates seeking revenge for
Krstić’s crimes against Muslims.125 This episode, occurring
within the Wakefield prison in Britain, underscores the security
risk of placing international convicts within a domestic prison
without physically isolating them.126 And, as these inmates are
already
culturally
and
relationally
isolated,
placing
international inmates in physical isolation further accentuates
the inherent flaws in a cooperating states model. Following the
Wakefield stabbing, Krstić was transferred back to the United
Nations Detention Unit in the Hague to await reassignment to
another cooperating state.127 Krstić remained at the Hague
Detention Unit for nearly two years before Poland agreed, in

123. See Martin Wainwright, Srebrenica General’s Attackers Get Life for Revenge
Stabbing
in
Prison,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
21,
2011,
12:09
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/
2011/feb/21/srebrenica-general-revenge-prison-attack
(explaining that Krstić was attacked and had sustained severe injuries in a high security
British prison).
124. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 376-77 (explaining security risks concerning
international prisoners).
125. Wainwright, supra note 123.
126. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining that the nationality of and
length of sentences for international convicts may result in a high security classification
because enforcing states want to prevent such prisoners from being harmed).
127. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. MICT-13-46-ES/IT-98-33-ES, Order
Designating the State in Which Radislav Krstić Is to Serve the Remainder of His
Sentence (July 19, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/presord/en/130719.pdf.
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May 2013, to receive Krstić pursuant a December 6, 2012 Polish
court order.128
The potential security issues only compound the limitations
of the cooperating state model. Not only may inmates fear being
sent to a distant and unfamiliar location, there is the added fear,
at least for some, that other inmates within the host state will
learn of their crimes and seek to inflict injurious retribution.
Krstić experienced this fear and sustained injuries while housed
in Britain. Charles Taylor voiced this fear, though the SCSL
discounted his pleas, keeping him imprisoned in Britain.129
Interestingly, the 3,000 mile distance between England and
Sierra Leone is equivalent to the distance separating Taylor’s
desired placement in Rwanda from Sierra Leone. But, as
Taylor’s request indicates, it is not merely distance that
exacerbates a sentence, but also family relations and security
concerns. When assessing the best host country for a particular
inmate, as we have seen with Krstić, issues relating to the
international convict’s security should be an integral part of the
sentencing decision.
D.

Rehabilitation, Release, and Reintegration

A fourth shortcoming with the status quo is the uncertainty
regarding early release and the absence of appropriate
rehabilitation and reintegration programs in enforcing states.130
Because the current model relies on cooperating states and
128. See id. (explaining that Poland agreed to received Krstić). Poland entered into
an Enforcement Agreement with the ICTY on September 18, 2008. Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Poland and the United Nations on the Enforcement of
Sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Pol.-U.N.,
Sept. 18, 2008, 2605 U.N.T.S. 177.
129. Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom
and for Transfer to Rwanda ¶ 4, In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES
(June 13, 2014). In re Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-ES, Decision on
Charles Ghankay Taylor’s Motion for Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the
United Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda, ¶ 38 (May 21, 2015). (explaining that a
special Trial Chamber appointed by RSCSL President Justice Philip N. Waki denied
Taylor’s motion in January 2015).
130. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 125 (explaining that there is a lack of
clear assessment criteria regarding the early release of international prisoners); see also
Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1202 (explaining how early release and rehabilitation
programs could be improved).
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utilizes local law, in combination with tribunal consultation, for
determining early release, international convicts with identical
sentences may be subject to differing rules regarding early
release.131 Mulgrew notes the shortcoming with this approach:
“A system that places the trigger for release eligibility with
enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for
discrimination due to the variation between the different
domestic laws.”132
In contrast to early release, the issue of rehabilitation,
apparently relevant to the ad hoc tribunals in sentencing, has
largely been overlooked in international enforcement.133 Under
the status quo, international tribunals delegate rehabilitation
assessments, both testing and reporting, to domestic prisons
that have little experience working with those convicted of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.134 As Kelder,
Holá, and van Wijk explain,
The fact that the tribunals are not actively involved in
the enforcement of sentences means that the [tribunal]
President relies heavily on information provided by
third parties . . . . Although enforcement states have not
been given any guidance on how to rehabilitate
international prisoners, the President typically trusts
their reports about a convicts’ behaviour in prison and
follows their advice in relation to the prisoner’s level of
rehabilitation.135
To delegate imprisonment of war criminals to enforcing states
whose penal policies target more ordinary criminals seems

131. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 26 (explaining that each State uses its
own rules when deciding whether to pardon a prisoner and then notifies the MICT
accordingly).
132. MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57.
133. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1179 (contending that rehabilitation has
been “entirely neglected by academia and practitioners alike”).
134. See id. at 1193-94 (observing that the tribunal “President seems to do little to
critically asses the underlying sources submitted [by enforcing states] to demonstrate
prisoners’ rehabilitation”).
135. Id.
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incongruent with the desire to treat international convicts
similarly.136 Inconsistencies in treatment will inevitably occur.
Mulgrew further observes that “the enforcing state is under
no obligation to make connections with post-release services in
third states,” thus limiting opportunities international convicts
have for reintegration.137 And, the basis for release hinges, at
least partially, on the cooperating state’s domestic structure for
early release.138 If rehabilitation entails reintegration into
society, an international prison with personnel targeting the
particular crimes covered – genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity – will far better address the unique nature of
such crimes and the motivations that lead otherwise ordinary
individuals to commit such extraordinary acts.139 Kelder, Holá,
and van Wijk assert that
International crimes . . . are not committed by
abnormal (deviant) and extraordinary people, but are
instead first and foremost characterized by the fact that
perpetrators commit crimes in abnormal and
extraordinary circumstances. [Thus,] conventional
rehabilitation programmes developed for deviant
individuals aimed to reintegrate them back into society
and to facilitate a crime-free life are not appropriate for
international prisoners.140
Without a permanent prison and a system coordinating
parole or probation, international convicts are, in the most real
sense, merely warehoused in domestic prisons.141 International
inmates serve their time and, once they are either scheduled for
release or released they are given little to no reintegration

136. See id. at 1196-97 (claiming that international criminals, because of the
large-scale crimes they commit, are fundamentally different than ordinary criminals).
137. Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390.
138. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 113 (explaining that the imprisonment
of an international prisoner is governed by the law of the enforcement state).
139. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1196-97 (discussing how persons who
commit international crimes tend to come from deviant societal contexts).
140. Id. at 1197.
141. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 (explaining that international
convicts cannot “avail themselves of opportunities designed to enable prisoners ‘to look
for work, to make contacts with social services and to prepare for freedom’”).
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efforts dedicated to their successful return into society.142 There
is generally no continued oversight or custodial supervision.143
Early release, in the current international context, typically
means absolute freedom. The notable exception appears to be
the RSCSL’s approach granting conditional release.144 However,
in some instances, early release means an inability to return
home or elsewhere.145 The individual may no longer be behind
bars, but neither is he or she necessarily free to return to their
pre-incarceration life.146
Under most domestic prison systems, inmates scheduled for
release go through a process to prepare them to re-enter society,
which may include graded reductions in security and increased
opportunities for self-sufficiency.147 Most domestic prison
systems maintain a programmatic approach to early release, be
it probation or some other form of reintegration that retains
some level of continuing oversight of the prisoner.148 But, under
the current system of cooperating states model where
international convicts are sent to distant locations to serve their
sentences, such domestic programs are generally not available
to international inmates set to leave the enforcing state upon
release.149 As Kelder, Holá, and van Wijk observe, “[i]n contrast
to the domestic jurisdictions, the practice of setting conditions

142. See id. (noting that under the current system, “it seems unlikely that
enforcing institutions will be able to provide meaningful support to international
prisoners preparing for return to society”).
143. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129.
144. SCSL Practice Direction, Early Release, supra note 74, pmb.
145. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129-30 (reporting on the varied outcomes
international prisoners face upon release, including at least one example where an
international prisoner, Erdemovic, was placed in a witness protection program and given
a new identity and several others where ICTR convicts were placed in a “safe house” in
Tanzania upon their release).
146. See id. (providing numerous examples of life after incarceration).
147. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS 9, 11 (2012) (emphasizing the attention paid to
rehabilitation and noting the availability of self-sufficiency aimed practices, such as
“prison leave and other authorized forms of exits from prison,” that are available in
domestic prison systems).
148. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 129.
149. See id. (describing life after release for international convicts as a time when
the “prisoners are literally ‘off the radar’”).
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upon early release – e.g., no repetition of offenses – does not
exist for ICTY and ICTR convicts.”150
Although early release for international convicts is
evaluated by assessing domestic law, and relies largely on local
assessment regarding rehabilitation, that same domestic law
does not provide programmatic support or continuing oversight
for the international convict.151 Lacking any monitoring system
for released international convicts, excepting the RSCSL
conditional release program, “the prisoners disappear from the
tribunals’ radar and are not of their concern.”152 Kelder, Holá,
and van Wijk provide troubling case examples where failure to
monitor those released by international tribunals have
seemingly undermined the values of international criminal
justice, with the perpetrators largely flaunting their freedom
and retracting any claims of remorse.153
To ensure that sentences are being uniformly served under
similar conditions and that rehabilitation and reintegration are
made part of the sentencing enforcement process, a permanent
prison with attendant personnel, parole officers, and consistent
rules relating to rehabilitation and early release is needed. If all
international convicts are being sentenced for similar crimes, or
at least crimes of a similar magnitude, there should be
standardized governing principles put in to operation based on
the underlying crime, independent from the nation state
receiving the inmate for sentencing enforcement purposes. The
current ad hoc approach to imprisonment leads to unacceptably
inconsistent approaches toward rehabilitation and early
release.154

150. Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1198.
151. Id. at 1193-94.
152. Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See id. at 1199-1200 (detailing the post-release behavior of ICTY convicts
Biljana Plavsic and Veselin Sljivancanin).
154. See MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57 (“A system that places the trigger for
release eligibility with enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for
discrimination due to the variation between the different domestic laws.”).
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Reintegration, both through graded release and continuing
oversight, is a vital component of penal policy.155 The current
model omits critical rehabilitation and reintegration structures
and, thus, provides additional support for concentrating the
sentencing enforcement process in an international prison
system.
IV.

OBSTACLES TO CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON

The creation of an international prison system, much like
the creation of an international court system, presents both
costs and risks. The ICC follows several ad hoc international
tribunals and holds the promise of a lasting solution to
addressing international crimes. These initial court efforts at
the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC have all incurred extensive
financial costs and burdens.156 And, because the work of the
tribunals created long prison sentences that have outlasted the
ad hoc tribunals, there are the additional costs related to the
MICT and the RSCSL.157 Thus, the ad hoc tribunals may have
ceased operations, but the sentences and cases still remaining
have required the creation of secondary or residual courts to
slowly winnow away at the remaining work still to be done. The
RSCSL projects that it may need to remain in operation until
2055 to finalize all its work relating to the enforcement of
sentences.158

155. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 147, pt. III. A. (noting that
the “essential aim of a penitentiary system is the reformation and social rehabilitation of
prisoners”).
156. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 10 (raising the question whether the “I.C.C. is
simply too expensive and ineffective to justify”); Gabriël Oosthuizen & Robert Schaeffer,
Complete Justice: Residual Functions and Potential Residual Mechanisms of the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 48, 59 (2008) (“The costs associated with the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL are high . . . .”).
157. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 1 (noting the additional costs
associated with implementing the MICT); Agreement to Establish RSCSL, supra note
66, art. 3 (granting the Parties and the oversight committee the option to “explore
alternative means of financing”).
158. See The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background,
supra note 66 (noting that as part of its ad hoc functions, the RSCSL “will have the
authority to manage requests for review from convicted persons and this function may
extend until 2055”).
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Judges, courtrooms, and court staff are expenses that must
be borne if an international court system is to function
effectively. Time has provided great experience, including a
demonstration of modest cooperation from nation states. From a
post-World War II version of “victor’s justice” to the modern ICC,
which covers nearly the entire world, international courts have
evolved slowly but deliberately. Perhaps then, as the world
community considers the financial cost of erecting and
maintaining a permanent international criminal court,159
thought should be given to erecting and maintaining a true,
permanent prison facility for international convicts.
The first obstacle will be location. Great consideration
should be given to those countries and locations where
construction might not be required from the ground up. Rather,
a location
– one that is centrally located in a politically
stable country with a solid record regarding human rights –
should be selected to refine an existing structure capable of
providing the highest level of service and security to
international convicts. But, a complicating factor in the analysis
for creating a single prison location is that our world is so
enormous and diverse. What one country could house such
distinctive populations supporting numerous languages,
cultures, and religions? These are troubling questions that have
not yet been adequately analyzed or discussed by scholars,
lawyers, and judges.
A.

The Costs

Much like the actual costs borne by the ICTY, ICTY, SCSL,
and ICC, there will be actual costs borne by an international
prison system, one involving building maintenance, staffing, and
programmatic expenditures. If the convicts at the former ad hoc
international tribunals or the ICC are to be held in a single
location or in regional facilities overseen by a single supervising
entity, a physical prison structure must either be built or
remodeled. These costs involve real money, including bricks and

159. See ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises
Construction, supra note 14 (explaining the funding for the permanent ICC in the
Netherlands).
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mortar. In addition, there will be staffing needs, from wardens,
to guards, to medical and religious personnel. Building and
maintaining a prison is a costly endeavor. Some country, entity,
international organization, or combination thereof will need to
absorb the costs associated with both constructing and running
an international prison.
There are costs of outfitting the inmates, creating and
printing prison rules, providing guards and prison staff capable
of communicating with the inmates, medical personnel and
facilities, access to psychological and psychiatric services,
educational and career training, access to religious and spiritual
advisors, and food services capable of feeding a variety of dietary
needs, and security.
And, much like the evolution from Spandau Prison in
Germany, where the Allies oversaw their convicts in a
conquered country,160 to a system where cooperating states host
international convicts, the trajectory suggests a need for
consolidation – either to a single international prison unit or,
perhaps, regional units existing under a single international
prison umbrella. As set forth above, there are many notable
shortcomings in the cooperating states model, from the obvious
and consistent lack of cooperation to issues stemming from early
release and lack of rehabilitation programs. Additionally, the
distance, linguistic, and security concerns are already noted as
issues under the status quo.
B.

Safety and Security Issues

In addition to real financial costs, there are safety risks
involved with creating an international prison. First, the risk of
placing all high level international criminals in a single location,
potentially with regional facilities, could increase security
concerns for individuals displeased with tribunal outcomes or
international justice. Because the ICC will be handling only
those individuals whose crimes merit international attention, it
160. See Wolfgang Saxon, Spandau Prison: Hess’s Lonely Dungeon, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/18/nyregion/spandau-prison-hess-slonely-dungeon.html (noting that Spandau was “the last vestige of postwar four-power
rule in Germany” whereby guards from Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the
United States oversaw the prison).
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can be expected that the crimes will stem, like those heard
before the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, from internal conflicts and
wars with continuing unrest in the home country. Such grouped
incarceration might embolden members of one of the warring
factions, or others, to target an international prison or
international prison employees. What country or countries
would be willing to assume the risk of housing the worst of the
worst, collectively, and withstand the constant security threat
such inmates pose? Is the concentration of the world’s most
notorious international criminals in a single location a truly
workable solution? While this concentration has already
occurred uneventfully, at least from a security perspective, in
the Hague and Tanzania, these distant locations provided some
measure of security for those angry in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or,
most recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
On the other hand, the question of security might also be
more easily answered in a single location where adequate
exterior and interior security may actually provide greater
protection to those convicted of the worst crimes known to
humanity. If a single location could be selected, the
concentration of individuals all posing a high security risk could
be collectively addressed to minimize security breaches. Further,
the location itself could provide heightened security protections
against outside threats. From island selections to remote areas
within numerous nation states, the issue of security poses both a
risk and potential advantage in terms of housing war criminals
and international convicts.
The security question naturally raises, and is tied to, the
related issue of location. How does the international community
address the risk in deciding where such international prison, or
regional prisons, might be built and maintained? Will there
continue to be European and African overrepresentation? The
variation of prison facilities between poorer countries and
wealthier, industrialized countries is relevant from a human
rights perspective. But, giving emphasis to wealthier countries
could compromise certain individuals’ access to family, legal
counsel, religious traditions, cultural institutions and dietary
requirements by placing a prison outside the realm of travel for
many families. While an international prison may not resolve
these “location” issues, at least all international convicts will be
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similarly disadvantaged and their families on notice of where
they must travel. And, if a single location is ultimately selected,
families confronting visa requests and housing needs will face
similar procedures for securing visits.
While location becomes relevant to ensuring safety, any
selected location cannot be so remote that family, friends and
others, like legal counsel, are prevented from visiting and
maintaining relations with the inmate. If a new, truly
international prison is to be constructed, efforts must be made to
protect against recreating the flaws existing in the current
system – such as isolation from friends and family. The most
centralized location, with adequate transport options (bus, rail
and air) should be sought. Regardless of location, there must be
efforts made to make an international prison truly transnational
and capable of hosting a range of nationalities, languages,
religious traditions and dietary needs.
Security is a major issue, presenting both potential risks
and rewards, but other demands – particularly those exposed
under the status quo – will quickly require attention.
C.

Creating Uniformity Among Diversity

The goal of an international prison must be to provide a
standardized global response to a universal problem. An
international prison will, eventually, have inmates from across
the world, bringing together a cacophony of languages and
cultures. The creators of an international prison will have to
work diligently to ensure that no matter who is incarcerated,
acceptable meals, rules and religious options are available to all.
There can be no superior cultural norm – no Westernization or
Easternization of treatment. There must be cultural sensitivity
and, yet, common norms. This delicate balance may actually be
the most daunting task facing the creation and maintenance of
an international prison.
In some countries, chain gang or work requirements exist.
In others, the focus of incarceration may be rehabilitation or
reintegration into society as a law-abiding, even educated,
citizen. But what is the penal goal of international justice? Will
inmates receive funds to purchase items at a commissary? Will
inmates be expected to work in jobs at the prison, as barbers,
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cooks and lawn care personnel? What standards of care, beyond
the United Nations minimum standards, will govern? And,
equally important, who will choose which norms govern? This
author would delegate entirely the task of assessing both penal
policies and creation of an international prison to one entity,
preferably one similar to that presented below.
The answers to these questions are still evolving. There
appears to be a deep incongruity between the lengthy sentences
issued by international tribunals with sentences served in
unfamiliar countries and the goal of rehabilitative urged by
human rights documents. This article does not allow for a more
thorough consideration of the ultimate penal policies an
international prison should adopt, but does note that
centralizing international convicts in a single prison will
undoubtedly lead to more fair and consistent treatment with a
more uniform approach to penal policy and does argue for
creation of a new entity to oversee the process.
To ensure uniform treatment for all international convicts
and in a move toward creating a permanent international
prison, I recommend the creation of an International Prison
Advisory Panel (IPAP) staffed with prison experts from a fair
cross section of the globe. The IPAP should be integrated into
the current ICC and MICT bodies, thereby informing the current
structure where enforcement state designations and early
release decisions are made by the ICC President or appropriate
RSCSL Chamber. The IPAP should address all inmate issues
arising from current internationally focused courts and residual
mechanisms, such as the ICC, the MICT, and RSCSL. The IPAP
should prioritize the creation and maintenance of an
international prison system as its focus. The IPAP’s initial
charter should establish goals for creating a permanent prison,
creating standardized penal policies for international convicts
and for staffing both a prison, inclusive of diverse rehabilitation
programs, and a standardized early release program for each
respective court (i.e. one standardized program for the ICC and
another for the RSCSL).
The IPAP should be funded by a reliable source, either the
United Nations or the ICC. If funded by the United Nations, the
IPAP could also be governed by the United Nations and located
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at the New York Headquarters or, in the alternative, wherever
the permanent prison location is. If the ICC becomes the source
of funding, the IPAP can be housed at the Hague or, again,
wherever the ultimate site of the permanent prison is. The IPAP
should be given input in the enforcement of international
sentences flowing from the ICC or any ad hoc tribunals as the
international community weans itself from the cooperating
states model and reliance on state input. While the current legal
structure does not permit complete delegation, this author
believes the legal framework should be amended to provide
IPAP with some role in sentence enforcement, including input
regarding early and conditional release.
IPAP is simply a concept, much like the Rome Statute was
two decades ago. To bring this idea to fruition would
undoubtedly require both reassessment and amendment to
governing documents binding the international tribunals. But,
to be effective, this idea requires complete incorporation into the
status quo, not merely a subsidiary existence adding to the
deficiencies of the status quo.
In terms of IPAP composition, there should be at least one
representative from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, the
Middle East and Russia or the Slavic countries. It would be
advisable to include those who have had experience dealing with
the housing of international convicts from the ICTY, the ICTR
and the SCSL. Countries refusing ICC membership or
jurisdictional application before the ICC should not be permitted
on the panel. Instead, countries whose citizens might be
vulnerable to international prosecution before the ICC and other
ad hoc tribunals should have both a voice and potentially
representation on the IPAP. The purpose of the IPAP will be to
ensure consistent treatment among internationally sentenced
individuals. At present, that task of ensuring fair and humane
treatment is shared by numerous entities and borne, largely, by
the host nation states themselves. Because sentencing
enforcement is an integral part of the criminal prosecution
process, including issues relating to early and conditional
release, the IPAP should be included in the process to ensure
that sentence enforcements become more uniform, predictive
and fair.
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The IPAP should have a minimum of seven and a maximum
of nine individual members, with a goal of securing race, gender
and religious diversity. Terms should be strictly limited to no
more than three years so that no one individual or country has a
hold on the ideas being discussed or programs pursued in a
permanent prison facility for the international community. The
terms among the panel should be staggered so that there is
some level of continuity among the panel. For example, if the
panel has nine members, each year there should be three
positions that become vacant for three new members. An IPAP
would ensure a continuing commitment to prison oversight and
improvements as international law evolves.
The advantages of creating an IPAP is that this group could
be responsible for all facets of creating, and ultimately,
overseeing an international prison, from budgeting to prison
inspections to determining policies and procedures for
international convicts. Further, because past sentences issued
by the ICTY and ICTR were not always consistent, IPAP should
provide some guidance in the sentencing enforcement process –
from state designation to early release, even if this guidance is
only placed in IPAP Advisories. The IPAP could further work
with the ICC, the MICT and the RSCSL to ensure that the
international community is developing an actual penal policy for
those found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
not simply perpetuating the ad hoc approach to the enforcement
of sentences. IPAP’s greatest contribution to international
criminal law, in fact, could be creating the first truly
international penal policy governing international crimes. This
article does not tackle the far more difficult question of what the
international penal policy should be, involving choices between
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation, among others, and
would think it advisable to delegate such Herculean task to the
IPAP. At present, the focus appears to be on imprisonment for a
term rather than imprisonment for a purpose.161 Creating and
utilizing an IPAP could help properly place imprisonment in the
larger context of an international criminal system, as opposed to
161. See generally Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12, 125 (noting the
general lack of uniformity of importance placed on the rehabilitation of international
criminals, and the generally long sentence terms they serve).
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merely warehousing convicted individuals, thereby improving on
the current free-floating, ad hoc system.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
PRISON OUTWEIGH THE RISKS

One must ask why little progress has been made regarding
the creation of an international prison. Is the issue safety,
finances, building location(s) or simply lassitude? Has any
government, committee or non-governmental organization
undertaken a proper study balancing the benefits versus risks of
creating an international prison? We have a clear need to
address the issue of punishment and imprisonment now that we
have a permanent court.162 And, the question of where these
international convicts will be housed moving forward is no
longer merely a theoretical problem. The time for creating an
international prison is upon us. We must act now.163 Creating an
IPAP provides one vision of a potential solution.
The time has come for a permanent prison solution. We have
an international criminal court. We need an international
prison. Deterrence will be furthered if the cooperation among
nations is both united and permanent. The ICC should be the
starting point for a larger, more permanent approach to
realizing the still unachieved promise of “never again.” The
world deserves an international criminal court that is capable of
enforcing its judgments without relying on willing or
cooperating states. Prison, for a court whose sentencing options
are primarily focused on incarceration, should have been a
starting point, not an afterthought. The time is ripe for an
international prison if, in fact, we are committed to
international justice, not merely prosecutions.

162. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (noting that a permanent criminal court will
require a permanent prison facility for placement of its condemned, who would best be
served by the “utilization of regional facilities”).
163. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 122 (noting that forty-five percent of all
international convicts have been released); ICC Res. RC/Res.3, supra note 50, ¶¶ 1-2
(noting that the Resolution, while again calling on States to “indicate to the Court their
willingness to accept sentenced persons[,]” also confirms that “a sentence of
imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available in the designated State
through an international or regional organization, mechanism or agency”).

